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Abstract
Much of the field of Machine Learning exhibits
a prominent set of failure modes, including vul-
nerability to adversarial examples, poor out-of-
distribution (OoD) detection, miscalibration, and
willingness to memorize random labelings of
datasets. We characterize these as failures of ro-
bust generalization, which extends the traditional
measure of generalization as accuracy or related
metrics on a held-out set. We hypothesize that
these failures to robustly generalize are due to the
learning systems retaining too much information
about the training data. To test this hypothesis,
we propose the Minimum Necessary Information
(MNI) criterion for evaluating the quality of a
model. In order to train models that perform well
with respect to the MNI criterion, we present a
new objective function, the Conditional Entropy
Bottleneck (CEB), which is closely related to the
Information Bottleneck (IB). We experimentally
test our hypothesis by comparing the performance
of CEB models with deterministic models and
Variational Information Bottleneck (VIB) models
on a variety of different datasets and robustness
challenges. We find strong empirical evidence
supporting our hypothesis that MNI models im-
prove on these problems of robust generalization.
1. Introduction
Despite excellent progress in classical generalization (e.g.,
accuracy on a held-out set), the field of Machine Learning
continues to struggle with the following issues:
• Vulnerability to adversarial examples. Most machine-
learned systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Many defenses have been proposed, but few have demon-
strated robustness against a powerful, general-purpose
adversary. Many proposed defenses are ad-hoc and fail in
the presence of a concerted attacker (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a; Athalye et al., 2018).
• Poor out-of-distribution detection. Most models do a
poor job of signaling that they have received data that
is substantially different from the data they were trained
on. Even generative models can report that an entirely
different dataset has higher likelihood than the dataset
they were trained on (Nalisnick et al., 2018). Ideally, a
trained model would give less confident predictions for
data that was far from the training distribution (as well as
for adversarial examples). Barring that, there would be
a clear, principled statistic that could be extracted from
the model to tell whether the model should have made
a low-confidence prediction. Many different approaches
to providing such a statistic have been proposed (Guo
et al., 2017; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2016; Hendrycks
& Gimpel, 2016; Liang et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017;
DeVries & Taylor, 2018), but most seem to do poorly on
what humans intuitively view as obviously different data.
• Miscalibrated predictions. Related to the issues above,
classifiers tend to be overconfident in their predic-
tions (Guo et al., 2017). Miscalibration reduces confi-
dence that a model’s output is fair and trustworthy.
• Overfitting to the training data. Zhang et al. (2016)
demonstrated that classifiers can memorize fixed random
labelings of training data, which means that it is possible
to learn a classifier with perfect inability to generalize.
This critical observation makes it clear that a fundamental
test of generalization is that the model should fail to learn
when given what we call information-free datasets.
We consider these to be problems of robust generalization,
which we define and discuss in Section 2. In this work, we
hypothesize that these problems of robust generalization all
have a common cause: models retain too much information
about the training data. We formalize this by introducing
the Minimum Necessary Information (MNI) criterion for
evaluating a learned representation (Section 3). We then
introduce an objective function that directly optimizes the
MNI, the Conditional Entropy Bottleneck (CEB) (Section 4)
and compare it with the closely-related Information Bot-
tleneck (IB) objective (Tishby et al., 2000) in Section 5.
In Section 6, we describe practical ways to optimize CEB
in a variety of settings.
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Finally, we give empirical evidence for the following claims:
• Better classification accuracy. MNI models can achieve
superior accuracy on classification tasks than models that
capture either more or less information than the minimum
necessary information (Sections 7.1 and 7.2).
• Improved robustness to adversarial examples. Retain-
ing excessive information about the training data results
in vulnerability to a variety of whitebox and transfer ad-
versarial examples. MNI models are substantially more
robust to these attacks (Sections 7.1 and 7.2).
• Strong out-of-distribution detection. The CEB objec-
tive provides a useful metric for out-of-distribution (OoD)
detection, and CEB models can detect OoD examples as
well or better than non-MNI models (Section 7.1).
• Better calibration. MNI models are better calibrated
than non-MNI models (Section 7.1).
• No memorization of information-free datasets. MNI
models fail to learn in information-free settings, which
we view as a minimum bar for demonstrating robust gen-
eralization (Section 7.1).
2. Robust Generalization
In classical generalization, we are interested in a model’s
performance on held-out data on some task of interest, such
as classification accuracy. In robust generalization, we want:
(RG1) to maintain the model’s performance in the classical
generalization setting; (RG2) to ensure the model’s perfor-
mance in the presence of an adversary (unknown at training
time); and (RG3) to detect adversarial and non-adversarial
data that strongly differ from the training distribution.
Adversarial training approaches considered in the litera-
ture so far (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016;
Madry et al., 2017) violate (RG1), as they typically result
in substantial decreases in accuracy. Similarly, provable
robustness approaches (e.g., Cohen et al. (2019); Wong
et al. (2018)) provide guarantees for a particular adversary
known at training time, also at a cost to test accuracy. To
our knowledge, neither approaches provide any mechanism
to satisfy (RG3). On the other hand, approaches for de-
tecting adversarial and non-adversarial out-of-distribution
(OoD) examples (Guo et al., 2017; Lakshminarayanan et al.,
2016; Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016; Liang et al., 2017; Lee
et al., 2017; DeVries & Taylor, 2018) are either known
to be vulnerable to adversarial attack (Carlini & Wagner,
2017a; Athalye et al., 2018), or do not demonstrate that the
approach provides robustness against unknown adveraries,
both of which violate (RG2).
Training on information-free datasets (Zhang et al., 2016)
provides an additional way to check if a learning system is
compatible with (RG1), as memorization of such datasets
necessarily results in maximally poor performance on any
test set. Model calibration is not obviously a necessary
condition for robust generalization, but if a model is well-
calibrated on a held-out set, its confidence may provide
some signal for distinguishing OoD examples, so we men-
tion it as a relevant metric for (RG3).
To our knowledge, the only works to date that have demon-
strated progress on robust generalization for modern ma-
chine learning datasets are the Variational Information Bot-
tleneck (Alemi et al., 2017; 2018) (VIB), and Information
Dropout (Achille & Soatto, 2018). Alemi et al. (2017) pre-
sented preliminary results that VIB improves adversarial
robustness on image classification tasks while maintain-
ing high classification accuracy ((RG1) and (RG2)). Alemi
et al. (2018) showed that VIB models provide a useful signal,
the Rate, R, for detecting OoD examples ((RG3)). Achille
& Soatto (2018) also showed preliminary results on ad-
versarial robustness and demonstrated failure to train on
information-free datasets.
In this work, we do not claim to “solve” robust general-
ization, but we do show notable improvement on all three
conditions simply by changing the training objective. This
evidence supports our core hypothesis that problems of ro-
bust generalization are caused in part by retaining too much
information about the training data.
3. The Minimum Necessary Information
We define the Minimum Necessary Information (MNI) crite-
rion for a learned representation in three parts:
• Information. We would like a representation Z that cap-
tures useful information about a dataset (X,Y). Entropy
is the unique measure of information (Shannon, 1948)1,
so the criterion prefers information-theoretic approaches.
• Necessity.2 The semantic value of information is given
by a task, which is specified by the set of variables in the
dataset. Here we will assume that the task of interest is
to predict Y given X using our representation Z.
• Minimality. Given all representations Z that can solve
the task, we require one that retains the smallest amount
of information about the task: infZ∈Z I(Z; X,Y).
Necessity can be defined as I(X;Y) ≤ I(Y;Z). Any less
information than that would prevent Z from solving the
1We assume familiarity with the mutual information and its
relationships to entropy and conditional entropy: I(X;Y) = H(X)−
H(X|Y) = H(Y) − H(Y |X) (Cover & Thomas, 2006).
2Achille & Soatto (2018) and other authors call this sufficiency.
We avoid the term due to potential confusion with minimum suffi-
cient statistics, which maintain the mutual information between a
model and the data it generates.
task of predicting Y from X. Minimality can be defined as
I(X;Y) ≥ I(X;Z). Any more information than that would re-
sult in Z having redundant information about X that is unnec-
essary for predicting Y . Since Z is constrained from above
and below, we have the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for perfectly achieving the Minimum Necessary
Information, which we call the MNI Point:
I(X;Y) = I(X;Z) = I(Y;Z) (1)
In general it may not be possible to satisfy Equation (1). As
discussed in Anantharam et al. (2013); Polyanskiy & Wu
(2017); Wu et al. (2019), for any given dataset (X,Y), there
is some maximum value for any possible representation Z:
1 ≥ ηKL = sup
Z←X→Y
I(Y;Z)
I(X;Z)
(2)
with equality only when X → Y is a deterministic map.
Training datasets are often deterministic in one direction or
the other. E.g., common image datasets map each distinct
image to a single label. Thus, in practice, we can often get
very close to the MNI given a sufficiently powerful model.
MNI and robust generalization. To satisfy (RG1) (clas-
sical generalization), a model must have I(X;Z) ≥ I(X;Y) =
I(Y;Z) on the test dataset. Shamir et al. (2010) show that
|I(X;Z) − Iˆ(X;Z)| ≈ O
(
2Iˆ(X;Z)√
N
)
, where Iˆ(·) indicates the train-
ing set information and N is the size of the training set.
More recently, Bassily et al. (2017) gave a similar result in a
PAC setting. Both results indicate that models that are com-
pressed on the training data should do better at generalizing
to similar test data.
Less clear is how an MNI model might improve on (RG2)
(adversarial robustness). In this work, we treat it as a hy-
pothesis that we investigate empirically rather than theo-
retically. The intuition behind the hypothesis can be de-
scribed in terms of the idea of robust and non-robust fea-
tures from Ilyas et al. (2019): non-robust features in X
should be compressed as much as possible when we learn
Z, whereas robust features should be retained as much as is
necessary. If Equation (1) is satisfied, Z must have “scaled”
the importance of the the features in X according to their
importance for predicting Y . Consequently, an attacker that
tries to take advantage of a non-robust feature will have to
change it much more in order to confuse the model, possibly
exceeding the constraints of the attack before it succeeds.
For (RG3) (detection), the MNI criterion does not directly
apply, as that will be a property of specific modeling choices.
However, if the model provides an accurate way to measure
I(X = x;Z = z) for a particular pair (x, z), Alemi et al. (2018)
suggests that can be a valuable signal for OoD detection.
4. The Conditional Entropy Bottleneck
We would like to learn a representation Z of X that will
be useful for predicting Y . We can represent this problem
setting with the Markov chain Z ← X ↔ Y . We would like
Z to satisfy Equation (1). Given the conditional indepen-
dence Z y Y |X in our Markov chain, I(Y;Z) ≤ I(X;Y), by
the data processing inequality. Thus, maximizing I(Y;Z) is
consistent with the MNI criterion.
However, I(X;Z) does not clearly have a constraint that
targets I(X;Y), as 0 ≤ I(X;Z) ≤ H(X). Instead, we can
notice the following identities at the MNI point:
I(X;Y |Z) = I(X;Z|Y) = I(Y;Z|X) = 0 (3)
The conditional mutual information is always non-negative,
so learning a compressed representation Z of X is equivalent
to minimizing I(X;Z|Y). Using our Markov chain and the
chain rule of mutual information (Cover & Thomas, 2006):
I(X;Z|Y) = I(X,Y;Z) − I(Y;Z) = I(X;Z) − I(Y;Z) (4)
This leads us to the general Conditional Entropy Bottleneck:
CEB ≡ min
Z
I(X;Z|Y) − γI(Y;Z) (5)
= min
Z
H(Z) − H(Z|X) − H(Z) + H(Z|Y)
− γ(H(Y) + H(Y |Z)) (6)
⇔ min
Z
−H(Z|X) + H(Z|Y) + γH(Y |Z) (7)
In line 7, we can optionally drop H(Y) because it is constant
with respect to Z. Here, any γ > 0 is valid, but for determin-
istic datasets (Section 3), γ = 1 will achieve the MNI for
a sufficiently powerful model. Further, we should expect
γ = 1 to yield consistent models and other values of γ not
to: since I(Y;Z) shows up in two forms in the objective,
weighing them differently forces the optimization procedure
to count bits of I(Y;Z) in two different ways, potentially
leading to a situation where H(Z)−H(Z|Y) , H(Y)−H(Y |Z)
at convergence. Given knowledge of those four entropies,
we can define a consistency metric for Z:
CI(Y;Z)(Z) ≡ |H(Z) − H(Z|Y) − H(Y) + H(Y |Z)| (8)
4.1. Variational Bound on CEB
We will variationally upper bound the first term of Equa-
tion (5) and lower bound the second term using three dis-
tributions: e(z|x), the encoder which defines the joint dis-
tribution we will use for sampling, p(x, y, z) ≡ p(x, y)e(z|x);
b(z|y), the backward encoder, an approximation of p(z|y);
and c(y|z), the classifier, an approximation of p(y|z) (the
name is arbitrary, as Y may not be labels). All of e(·), b(·),
and c(·) may have learned parameters, just like the encoder
and decoder of a VAE (Kingma & Welling, 2014), or the
encoder, classifier, and marginal in VIB.
H(X) H(Y) H(X) H(Y)
IB CEB
Figure 1. Information diagrams showing how IB and CEB max-
imize and minimize different regions. : regions inaccessible
to the objective due to the Markov chain Z ← X ↔ Y . : re-
gions being maximized by the objective (I(Y;Z) in both cases).
: regions being minimized by the objective. IB minimizes the
intersection between Z and both H(X|Y) and I(X;Y). CEB only
minimizes the intersection between Z and H(X|Y).
The first term of Equation (5):3
I(X;Z|Y) =−H(Z|X) + H(Z|Y) = 〈log e(z|x)〉 − 〈log p(z|y)〉
(9)
=
〈
log e(z|x)〉 − 〈log b(z|y)〉 − 〈KL[p(z|y)||b(z|y)]〉
(10)
≤ 〈log e(z|x)〉 − 〈log b(z|y)〉 (11)
The second term of Equation (5):
I(Y;Z) =H(Y) − H(Y |Z) ∝ −H(Y |Z) = 〈log p(y|z)〉 (12)
=
〈
log c(y|z)〉 + 〈KL[p(y|z)||c(y|z)]〉 (13)
≥ 〈log c(y|z)〉 (14)
These variational bounds give us a tractable objective func-
tion for amortized inference, the Variational Conditional
Entropy Bottleneck (VCEB):
VCEB ≡min
e,b,c
〈
log e(z|x)〉 − 〈log b(z|y)〉 − γ 〈log c(y|z)〉
(15)
There are a number of other ways to optimize Equation (5).
We describe a few of them in Section 6 and the supplemen-
tary material.
5. Comparison to the Information Bottleneck
The Information Bottleneck (IB) (Tishby et al., 2000) learns
a representation Z from X subject to a soft constraint:
IB ≡ min
Z
I(X;Z) − βI(Y;Z) (16)
where β−1 controls the strength of the constraint. As β→ ∞,
IB recovers the standard cross-entropy loss.
3 We write expectations
〈
log e(z|x)〉. They are always with re-
spect to the joint distribution; here, that is p(x, y, z) ≡ p(x, y)e(z|x).
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Figure 2. Geometry of the feasible regions for IB and CEB, with
all points labeled. CEB rectifies IB’s parallelogram by subtracting
I(Y;Z) at every point. Everything outside of the black lines is
unattainable by any model on any dataset.
In Figure 1 we show information diagrams comparing which
regions IB and CEB maximize and minimize.4 CEB avoids
trying to both minimize and maximize the central region
at the same time. In Figure 2 we show the feasible regions
for CEB and IB, labeling the MNI point on both. CEB’s
rectification of the information plane means that we can
always measure in absolute terms how much more we could
compress our representation at the same predictive perfor-
mance: I(X;Z|Y) ≥ 0. For IB, it is not possible to tell a
priori how far we are from optimal compression.
From Equations (4), (5) and (16), it is clear that CEB and
IB are equivalent for γ = β − 1. To simplify comparison of
the two objectives, we can parameterize them with:
ρ = log γ = log(β − 1) (17)
Under this parameterization, for deterministic datasets, suf-
ficiently powerful models will target the MNI point at ρ = 0.
As ρ increases, more information is captured by the model.
ρ < 0 may capture less than the MNI. ρ > 0 may capture
more than the MNI.
Amortized IB. As described in Tishby et al. (2000), IB
is a tabular method, so it is not usable for amortized infer-
ence.5 Two recent works have extended IB for amortized
inference. Achille & Soatto (2018) presents InfoDropout,
which uses IB to motivate a variation on Dropout (Srivastava
et al., 2014). Alemi et al. (2017) presents the Variational
Information Bottleneck (VIB):
VIB ≡ 〈log e(z|x)〉 − 〈logm(z)〉) − β 〈log c(y|z)〉 (18)
Instead of the backward encoder, VIB has a marginal
posterior, m(z), which is a variational approximation to
e(z) =
∫
dx p(x)e(z|x).
Following Alemi et al. (2018), we define the Rate (R):
R ≡ 〈log e(z|x)〉 − 〈logm(z)〉 ≥ I(X;Z) (19)
4See Yeung (1991) for a theoretical explanation of information
diagrams.
5The tabular optimization procedure used for IB trivially ap-
plies to CEB, just by setting β = 2.
We similarly define the Residual Information (ReX):
ReX ≡ 〈log e(z|x)〉 − 〈log b(z|y)〉 ≥ I(X;Z|Y) (20)
During optimization, observing R does not tell us how
tightly we are adhering to the MNI. However, observing
ReX tells us exactly how many bits we are from the MNI
point, assuming that our current classifier is optimal.
For convenience, define CEBx ≡ CEBρ=x, and likewise for
VIB. We can compare variational CEB with VIB by taking
their difference at ρ = 0:
CEB0 − VIB0 = 〈log b(z|y)〉 − 〈logm(z)〉 (21)
− 〈log c(y|z)〉 + 〈log p(y)〉 (22)
Solving for m(z) when that difference is 0:
m(z) =
b(z|y)p(y)
c(y|z) (23)
Since the optimal m∗(z) is the marginalization of e(z|x), at
convergence we must have:
m∗(z) =
∫
dx p(x)e(z|x) = p(z|y)p(y)
p(y|z) (24)
This solution may be difficult to find, as m(z) only gets
information about y indirectly through e(z|x). For otherwise
equivalent models, we may expect VIB0 to converge to a
looser approximation of I(X;Z) = I(Y;Z) = I(X;Y) than
CEB. Since VIB optimizes an upper bound on I(X;Z), VIB0
will report R converging to I(X;Y), but may capture less than
the MNI. In contrast, if ReX converges to 0, the variational
tightness of b(z|y) to the optimal p(z|y) depends only on the
tightness of c(y|z) to the optimal p(y|z).
6. Model Variants
We introduce some variants on the basic variational CEB
classification model that we will use in Section 7.2.
6.1. Bidirectional CEB
We can learn a shared representation Z that can be used
to predict both X and Y with the following bidirectional
CEB model: ZX ← X ↔ Y → ZY . This corresponds to the
following joint: p(x, y, zX , zY ) ≡ p(x, y)e(zX |x)b(zY |y). The
main CEB objective can then be applied in both directions:
CEBbidir ≡ min −H(ZX |X) + H(ZX |Y) + γXH(Y |ZX)
− H(ZY |Y) + H(ZY |X) + γYH(X|ZY ) (25)
For the two latent representations to be useful, we want them
to be consistent with each other (minimally, they must have
the same parametric form). Fortunately, that consistency
is trivial to encourage by making the natural variational
substitutions: p(zY |x) → e(zY |x) and p(zX |y) → b(zX |y).
This gives variational CEBbidir:
min
〈
log e(zX |x)〉 − 〈log b(zX |y)〉 − γX 〈log c(y|zX)〉
+
〈
log b(zY |y)〉 − 〈log e(zY |x)〉 − γY 〈log d(x|zY )〉 (26)
where d(x|z) is a decoder distribution. At convergence, we
learn a unified Z that is consistent with both ZX and ZY ,
permitting generation of either output given either input
in the trained model, in the same spirit as Vedantam et al.
(2018), but without needing to train a joint encoder q(z|x, y).
6.2. Consistent Classifier
We can reuse the backwards encoder as a classifier: c(y|z) ∝
b(z|y)p(y). We refer to this as the Consistent Classifier:
c(y|z) ≡ softmax b(z|y)p(y). If the labels are uniformly
distributed, the p(y) factor can be dropped; otherwise, it
suffices to use the empirical p(y). Using the consistent clas-
sifier for classification problems results in a model that only
needs parameters for the two encoders, e(z|x) and b(z|y).
This classifier differs from the more common maximum a
posteriori (MAP) classifier because b(z|y) is not the sam-
pling distribution of either Z or Y .
6.3. CatGen Decoder
We can further generalize the idea of the consistent classifier
to arbitrary prediction tasks by relaxing the requirement that
we perfectly marginalize Y in the softmax. Instead, we
can marginalize Y over any minibatch of size K we see at
training time, under an assumption of a uniform distribution
over the training examples we sampled:
p(y|z) = p(z|y)p(y)∫
dy′ p(z|y′)p(y′) (27)
≈ p(z|y)
1
K∑K
k=1 p(z|yk) 1K
=
p(z|y)∑K
k=1 p(z|yk)
(28)
≈ b(z|y)∑K
k=1 b(z|yk)
≡ c(y|z) (29)
We can immediately see that this definition of c(y|z) gives a
valid distribution, as it is just a softmax over the minibatch.
That means it can be directly used in the original objective
without violating the variational bound. We call this decoder
CatGen, for Categorical Generative Model because it can
trivially “generate” Y: the softmax defines a categorical
distribution over the batch; sampling from it gives indices
of Y = y j that most closely correspond to Z = zi.
Maximizing I(Y;Z) in this manner is a universal task, in
that it can be applied to any paired data X,Y . This includes
images and labels – the CatGen model may be used in place
of both c(y|zX) and d(x|zY ) in the CEBbidir model (using
e(z|x) for d(x|zY )). This avoids a common concern when
dealing with multivariate predictions: if predicting X is dis-
proportionately harder than predicting Y , it can be difficult
to balance the model (Vedantam et al., 2018; Higgins et al.,
2018). For CatGen models, predicting X is never any harder
than predicting Y , since in both cases we are just trying to
choose the correct example out of K possibilities.
It turns out that CatGen is mathematically equivalent to Con-
trastive Predictive Coding (CPC) (Oord et al., 2018) after an
offset of logK. We can see this using the proof from Poole
et al. (2019), and substituting log b(z|y) for f (y, z):
I(Y;Z) ≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
E∏ j yk ,z∼p(y j)p(xk |yk)e(z|xk)
[
log
e f (yk ,z)
1
K
∑K
i=1 e f (yi,z)
]
(30)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
E∏ j yk ,z∼p(y j)p(xk |yk)e(z|xk)
[
log
b(z|yk)
1
K
∑K
i=1 b(z|yi)
]
(31)
The advantage of the CatGen approach over CPC in the CEB
setting is that we already have parameterized the forward
and backward encoders to compute I(X;Z|Y), so we don’t
need to introduce any new parameters when using CatGen
to maximize the I(Y;Z) term.
As with CPC, the CatGen bound is constrained by logK,
but when targeting the MNI, it is more likely that we can
train with logK ≥ I(X;Y). This is trivially the case for the
datasets we explore here, where I(X;Y) ≤ log 10. It is also
practical for larger datasets like ImageNet, where models
are routinely trained with batch sizes in the thousands (e.g.,
Goyal et al. (2017)), and I(X;Y) ≤ log 1000.
7. Experiments
We evaluate deterministic, VIB, and CEB models on Fash-
ion MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017a) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky
& Hinton, 2009). Our experiments focus on comparing
the performance of otherwise identical models when we
change only the objective function and vary ρ. Thus, we
are interested in relative differences in performance that
can be directly attributed to the difference in objective and
ρ. These experiments cover the three aspects of Robust
Generalization (Section 2): (RG1) (classical generalization)
in Sections 7.1 and 7.2; (RG2) (adversarial robustness) in
Sections 7.1 and 7.2; and (RG3) (detection) in Section 7.1.
7.1. (RG1), (RG2), and (RG3): Fashion MNIST
Fashion MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017b) is an interesting dataset
in that it is visually complex and challenging, but small
enough to train in a reasonable amount of time. We trained
60 different models on Fashion MNIST, four each for the
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Figure 3. Test accuracy, maximum rate lower bound RX ≤ I(Z; X)
seen during training, and robustness to targeted PGD L2 and L∞
attacks on CEB, VIB, and Deterministic models trained on Fashion
MNIST. At every ρ the CEB models outperform the VIB models
on both accuracy and robustness, while having essentially identical
maximum rates. None of these models is adversarially trained.
following 15 types: a deterministic model (Determ); seven
VIB models (VIB−1, ..., VIB5); and seven CEB models
(CEB−1, ..., CEB5). Subscripts indicate ρ. All 60 models
share the same inference architecture and are trained with
otherwise identical hyperparameters.6
(RG1): Accuracy and compression. In Figure 3 we see
that both VIB and CEB have improved accuracy over the
deterministic baseline, consistent with compressed represen-
tations generalizing better. Also, CEB outperforms VIB
at every ρ, which we can attribute to the tighter varia-
tional bound given by minimizing ReX rather than R. In
the case of a simple classification problem with a uniform
distribution over classes in the training set (like Fashion
MNIST), we can directly compute I(X;Y) = logC, where
C is the number of classes. In order to compare the rela-
tive complexity of the learned representations for the VIB
and CEB models, in the second panel of Figure 3 we
show the maximum rate lower bound seen during train-
ing: RX ≡
〈
log e(z|x)1
K
∑K
k e(z|xk)
〉
≤ I(X;Z) using the encoder’s
minibatch marginal for both VIB and CEB.7 The two sets
of models show nearly the same RX at each value of ρ. Both
models converge to exactly I(X;Y) = log 10 ≈ 2.3 nats at
ρ = 0, as predicted by the derivation of CEB.
(RG2): Adversarial robustness. The bottom two panels
of Figure 3 show robustness to targeted Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) L2 and L∞ attacks (Madry et al., 2017).
All of the attacks are targeting the trouser class of Fashion
MNIST, as that is the most distinctive class. Targeting a
less distinctive class, such as one of the shirt classes, would
confuse the difficulty of classifying the different shirts and
the robustness of the model to adversaries. To measure ro-
6See the supplemental material for details.
7This lower bound on I(X;Z) is the “InfoNCE with a tractable
encoder” bound from Poole et al. (2019).
OoD ModelAdv Succ ↓ Thrsh.
FPR @
95% TPR ↓
AUROC
↑
AUPR
In ↑
U(0,1)
Determ H 35.8 93.5 97.1
VIB4 R 0.0 100.0 100.0
VIB0 R 80.6 57.1 51.4
CEB0 R 0.0 100.0 100.0
MNIST
Determ H 59.0 88.4 90.0
VIB4 R 0.0 100.0 100.0
VIB0 R 12.3 66.7 91.1
CEB0 R 0.1 94.4 99.9
Vertical
Flip
Determ H 66.8 88.6 90.2
VIB4 R 0.0 100.0 100.0
VIB0 R 17.3 52.7 91.3
CEB0 R 0.0 90.7 100.0
CW
Determ H 15.4 90.7 86.0100.0%
VIB4 R 0.0 100.0 100.055.2%
VIB0 R 0.0 98.7 100.035.8%
CEB0 R 0.0 99.7 100.035.8%
Table 1. Results for out-of-distribution detection (OoD). Thrsh. is
the threshold score used: H is the entropy of the classifier; R is
the rate. Determ cannot compute R, so only H is shown. For VIB
and CEB models, H is always inferior to R, similar to findings
in Alemi et al. (2018), so we omit it. Adv Succ is attack success of
the CW adversary (bottom rows). Arrows denote whether higher
or lower scores are better. Bold indicates the best score in that
column for that OoD dataset.
bustness to the targeted attacks, we count the number of
predictions that changed from a correct prediction on the
clean image to an incorrect prediction of the target class on
the adversarial image, and divide by the original number of
correct predictions. Consistent with testing (RG2), these ad-
versaries are completely unknown to the models at training
time – none of these models see any adversarial examples
during training. CEB again outperforms VIB at every ρ, and
the deterministic baseline at all but the least-compressed
model (ρ = 5). We also see for both models that as ρ de-
creases, the robustness to both attacks increases, indicating
that more compressed models are more robust.
Consistent with the MNI hypothesis, at ρ = 0 we end up
with CEB models that have hit exactly 2.3 nats for the
rate lower bound, have maintained high accuracy, and have
strong robustness to both attacks. Moving to ρ = −1 gives
only a small improvement to robustness, at the cost of a
large decrease in accuracy.
(RG3): Out-of-distribution detection. We compare the
ability of Determ, CEB0, VIB0, and VIB4 to detect four dif-
ferent out-of-distribution (OoD) detection datasets. U(0, 1)
is uniform noise in the image domain. MNIST uses the
MNIST test set. Vertical Flip is the most challenging, using
vertically flipped Fashion MNIST test images, as originally
a
b
c
d
Figure 4. Calibration plots with 90% confidence intervals for four
of the models after 2,000 steps, 20,000 steps, and 40,000 steps
(left, center, and right of each trio): a is CEB0; b is VIB0; c is
VIB2; d is Determ. Perfect calibration corresponds to the dashed
diagonal lines. Underconfidence occurs when the points are above
the diagonal. Overconfidence is below the diagonal. The ρ = 0
models are nearly perfectly calibrated still at 20,000 steps, but even
at ρ = 2, the VIB model is almost as overconfident as Determ.
proposed in Alemi et al. (2018). CW is the Carlini-Wagner
L2 attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) at the default settings
found in Papernot et al. (2018), and additionally includes
the adversarial attack success rate against each model.
We use two different metrics for thresholding, proposed
in Alemi et al. (2018). H is the classifier entropy. R is the
rate, defined in Section 5. These two threshold scores are
used with the standard suite of proper scoring rules (Lee
et al., 2018): False Positive Rate at 95% True Positive Rate
(FPR 95% TPR), Area Under the ROC Curve (AUROC),
and Area Under the Precision-Recall Curve (AUPR).
Table 1 shows that using R to detect OoD examples can be
much more effective than using classifier-based approaches.
The deterministic baseline model is far weaker at detection
using H than either of the high-performing stochastic mod-
els (CEB0 and VIB4). Those models both saturate detection
performance, providing reliable signals for all four OoD
datasets. However, as VIB0 demonstrates, simply having R
available as a signal does not guarantee good detection. As
we saw above, the VIB0 models had noticeably worse classi-
fication performance, indicating that they had not achieved
the MNI point: I(Y;Z) < I(X;Z) for those models. These
results indicate that for detection, violating the MNI crite-
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Figure 5. Left: Accuracy on untargeted L∞ attacks at different
values of ε for all 10,000 CIFAR10 test set examples. CEB0 is
the model with the highest accuracy (97.51%) trained at ρ = 0.
CEB5 is the model with the highest accuracy (97.06%) trained at
ρ = 5. Madry is the best adversarially-trained model from Madry
et al. (2017) with 87.3% accuracy (values provided by Aleksander
Madry). CEB5 ⇒CEB0 is transfer attacks from the CEB5 model
to the CEB0 model. Madry⇒CEB0 is transfer attacks from the
Madry model to the CEB0 model. Madry was trained with 7 steps
of PGD at ε = 8 (grey dashed line). Chance is 10% (grey dotted
line). Right: Accuracy on untargeted L2 attacks at different values
of ε. All values are collected at 7 steps of PGD. CEB0 outperforms
Madry everywhere except the region of L∞ε ∈ [2, 7]. Madry
appears to have overfit to L∞, given its poor performance on L2
attacks relative to either CEB model. None of the CEB models are
adversarially trained.
rion by having I(X;Z) > I(X;Y) may not be harmful, but
violating the criterion in the opposite direction is harmful.
(RG3): Calibration. A well-calibrated model is correct
half of the time it gives a confidence of 50% for its predic-
tion. In Figure 4, we show calibration plots at various points
during training for four models. Calibration curves help
analyze whether models are underconfident or overconfi-
dent. Each point in the plots corresponds to a 5% confidence
bin. Accuracy is averaged for each bin. All four networks
move from under- to overconfidence during training. How-
ever, CEB0 and VIB0 end up only slightly overconfident,
while ρ = 2 is already sufficient to make VIB and CEB (not
shown) nearly as overconfident as the deterministic model.
(RG1): Overfitting Experiments. We replicate the basic
experiment from Zhang et al. (2016) by using the images
from Fashion MNIST, but replacing the training labels with
fixed random labels. This dataset is information-free be-
cause I(X;Y) = 0. We use that dataset to train multiple
deterministic models, as well as CEB and VIB models at ρ
from 0 through 7. We find that the CEB and VIB models
with ρ < 6 never learn, even after 100 epochs of training,
but the deterministic models always learn. After about 40
epochs of training they begin to memorize the random la-
bels, indicating severe overfitting and a perfect failure to
generalize.
7.2. (RG1) and (RG2): CIFAR10 Experiments
For CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) we trained the
largest Wide ResNet (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016b) we
could fit on a single GPU with a batch size of 250. This was
a 62×7 model trained using AutoAugment (Cubuk et al.,
2018). We trained 3 CatGen CEBbidir models each of CEB0
and CEB5 and then selected the two models with the highest
test accuracy for the adversarial robustness experiments. We
evaluated the CatGen models using the consistent classifier,
since CatGen models only train e(z|x) and b(z|y). CEB0
reached 97.51% accuracy. This result is better than the
28×10 Wide ResNet from AutoAugment by 0.19 percentage
points, although it is still worse than the Shake-Drop model
from that paper. We additionally tested the model on the
CIFAR-10.1 test set (Recht et al., 2018), getting accuracy of
93.6%. This is a gap of only 3.9 percentage points, which
is better than all of the results reported in that paper, and
substantially better than the Wide ResNet results (but still in-
ferior to the Shake-Drop AutoAugment results). The CEB5
model reached 97.06% accuracy on the normal test set and
91.9% on the CIFAR-10.1 test set, showing that increased ρ
gave substantially worse generalization.
To test robustness of these models, we swept  for both
PGD attacks (Figure 5). The CEB0 model not only has
substantially higher accuracy than the adversarially-trained
Wide ResNet from Madry et al. (2017) (Madry), it also
beats the Madry model on both the L2 and the L∞ attacks
at almost all values of . We also show that this model is
even more robust to two transfer attacks, where we used the
CEB5 model and the Madry model to generate PGD attacks,
and then test them on the CEB0 model. This result indicates
that these models are not doing “gradient masking”, a failure
mode of some attempts at adversarial defense (Athalye et al.,
2018), since these are black-box attacks that do not rely on
taking gradients through the target model.
8. Conclusion
We have presented the Conditional Entropy Bottleneck
(CEB), motivated by the Minimum Necessary Information
(MNI) criterion and the hypothesis that failures of robust
generalization are due in part to learning models that re-
tain too much information about the training data. We have
shown empirically that simply by switching to CEB, mod-
els may substantially improve their robust generalization,
including (RG1) higher accuracy, (RG2) better adversarial
robustness, and (RG3) stronger OoD detection. We believe
that the MNI criterion and CEB offer a promising path for-
ward for many tasks in machine learning by permitting fast
amortized inference in an easy-to-implement framework
that improves robust generalization.
Here we collect a number of results that are not critical to
the core of the paper, but may be of interest to particular
audiences.
A. Model Details
A.1. Fashion MNIST
All of the models in our Fashion MNIST experiments have
the same core architecture: A 7×2 Wide Resnet (Zagoruyko
& Komodakis, 2016a) for the encoder, with a final layer of
D = 4 dimensions for the latent representation, followed by
a two layer MLP classifier using ELU (Clevert et al., 2015)
activations with a final categorical distribution over the 10
classes.
The stochastic models parameterize the mean and variance
of a D = 4 fully covariate multivariate Normal distribution
with the output of the encoder. Samples from that distri-
bution are passed into the classifier MLP. Apart from that
difference, the stochastic models don’t differ from Determ
during evaluation. None of the five models uses any form
of regularization (e.g., L1, L2, DropOut (Srivastava et al.,
2014), BatchNorm (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015)).
The VIB models have an additional learned marginal, m(z),
which is a mixture of 240 D = 4 fully covariate multivari-
ate Normal distributions. The CEB model instead has the
backward encoder, b(z|y) which is a D = 4 fully covariate
multivariate Normal distribution parameterized by a 1 layer
MLP mapping the label, Y = y, to the mean and variance.
In order to simplify comparisons, for CEB we additionally
train a marginal m(z) identical in form to that used by the
VIB models. However, for CEB, m(z) is trained using a
separate optimizer so that it doesn’t impact training of the
CEB objective in any way. Having m(z) for both CEB and
VIB allows us to compare the rate, R, of each model except
Determ.
A.2. CIFAR-10
For the 62×7 CEB CIFAR-10 models, we used the Au-
toAugment policies for CIFAR-10. We trained the models
for 800 epochs, lowering the learning rate by a factor of 10
at 400 and 600 epochs. We trained all of the models using
Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015) at a base learning rate of 10−3.
A.3. Distributional Families
Any distributional family may be used for the encoder. Repa-
rameterizable distributions (Kingma & Welling, 2014; Fig-
urnov et al., 2018) are convenient, but it is also possible
to use the score function trick (Williams, 1992) to get a
high-variance estimate of the gradient for distributions that
have no explicit or implicit reparameterization. In general,
a good choice for b(z|y) is the same distributional family as
H(X) H(Y)
H(Z1)
H(Z2)
Figure 6. Information diagram for the basic hierarchical CEB
model, Z2 ← Z1 ← X ↔ Y .
e(z|x), or a mixture thereof. These are modeling choices that
need to be made by the practitioner, as they depend on the
dataset. In this work, we chose normal distributions because
they are easy to work with and will be the common choice
for many problems, particularly when parameterized with
neural networks, but that choice is incidental rather than
fundamental.
B. Mutual Information Optimization
As an objective function, CEB is independent of the methods
used to optimize it. Here we focus on variational objectives
because they are simple, tractable, and well-understood, but
any approach to optimize mutual information terms can
work, so long as they respect the side of the bounds required
by the objective. For example, both Oord et al. (2018);
Hjelm et al. (2018) could be used to maximize I(Y;Z).
B.1. Finitness of the Mutual Information
The conditions for infinite mutual information given in Am-
jad & Geiger (2018) do not apply to either CEB or VIB, as
they both use stochastic encoders e(z|x). In our experiments
using continuous representations, we did not encounter mu-
tual information terms that diverged to infinity, although it
is possible to make modeling and data choices that make it
more likely that there will be numerical instabilities. This
is not a flaw specific to CEB or VIB, however, and we
found numerical instability to be almost non-existent across
a wide variety of modeling and architectural choices for
both variational objectives.
C. Additional CEB Objectives
Here we describe a few more variants of the CEB objective.
C.1. Hierarchical CEB
Thus far, we have focused on learning a single latent repre-
sentation (possibly composed of multiple latent variables
at the same level). Here, we consider one way to learn a
hierarchical model with CEB.
Consider the graphical model Z2 ← Z1 ← X ↔ Y . This is
the simplest hierarchical supervised representation learning
model. The general form of its information diagram is given
in Figure 6.
The key observation for generalizing CEB to hierarchical
models is that the target mutual information doesn’t change.
By this, we mean that all of the Zi in the hierarchy should
cover I(X;Y) at convergence, which means maximizing
I(Y;Zi). It is reasonable to ask why we would want to train
such a model, given that the final set of representations are
presumably all effectively identical in terms of informa-
tion content. Doing so allows us to train deep models in a
principled manner such that all layers of the network are
consistent with each other and with the data. We need to
be more careful when considering the residual information
terms, though – it is not the case that we want to minimize
I(X;Zi|Y), which is not consistent with the graphical model.
Instead, we want to minimize I(Zi−1;Zi|Y), defining Z0 = X.
This gives the following simple Hierarchical CEB objective:
CEBhier ≡min
∑
i
I(Zi−1;Zi|Y) − I(Y;Zi) (32)
⇔min
∑
i
−H(Zi|Zi−1) + H(Zi|Y) + H(Y |Zi) (33)
Because all of the Zi are targetting Y , this objective is as
stable as regular CEB.
C.2. Sequence Learning
Many of the richest problems in machine learning vary over
time. In Bialek & Tishby (1999), the authors define the
Predictive Information:
I(Xpast, X f uture) =
〈
log
p(xpast, x f uture)
p(xpast)p(x f uture)
〉
This is of course just the mutual information between the
past and the future. However, under an assumption of tem-
poral invariance (any time of fixed length is expected to
have the same entropy), they are able to characterize the
predictive information, and show that it is a subextensive
quantity: limT→∞ I(T )/T → 0, where I(T ) is the predictive
information over a time window of length 2T (T steps of
the past predicting T steps into the future). This concise
statement tells us that past observations contain vanishingly
small information about the future as the time window in-
creases.
The application of CEB to extracting the predictive informa-
tion is straightforward. Given the Markov chain X<t → X≥t,
we learn a representation Zt that optimally covers I(X<t, X≥t)
in Predictive CEB:
CEBpred ≡min I(X<t;Zt |X≥t) − I(X≥t,Zt) (34)
⇒min−H(Zt |X<t) + H(Zt |X≥t) + H(X≥t |Zt) (35)
Given a dataset of sequences, CEBpred may be extended to
a bidirectional model. In this case, two representations are
learned, Z<t and Z≥t. Both representations are for timestep
t, the first representing the observations before t, and the
second representing the observations from t onwards. As in
the normal bidirectional model, using the same encoder and
backwards encoder for both parts of the bidirectional CEB
objective ties the two representations together.
Modeling and architectural choices. As with all of the
variants of CEB, whatever entropy remains in the data after
capturing the entropy of the mutual information in the rep-
resentation must be modeled by the decoder. In this case, a
natural modeling choice would be a probalistic RNN with
powerful decoders per time-step to be predicted. However,
it is worth noting that such a decoder would need to sam-
ple at each future step to decode the subsequent step. An
alternative, if the prediction horizon is short or the predicted
data are small, is to decode the entire sequence from Zt in
a single, feed-forward network (possibly as a single autore-
gression over all outputs in some natural sequence). Given
the subextensivity of the predictive information, that may
be a reasonable choice in stochastic environments, as the
useful prediction window may be small.
Likely a better alternative, however, is to use the CatGen
decoder, as no generation of the long future sequences is
required in that case.
Multi-scale sequence learning. As in WaveNet (Van
Den Oord et al., 2016), it is natural to consider sequence
learning at multiple different temporal scales. Combining
an architecture like time-dilated WaveNet with CEB is as
simple as combining CEBpred with CEBhier (Appendix C.1).
In this case, each of the Zi would represent a wider time
dilation conditioned on the aggregate Zi−1.
C.3. Unsupervised CEB
For unsupervised learning, it seems challenging to put the
decision about what information should be kept into objec-
tive function hyperparameters, as in the β VAE and penalty
VAE (Alemi et al., 2018) objectives. That work showed that
it is possible to constrain the amount of information in the
learned representation, but it is unclear how those objective
functions keep only the “correct” bits of information for
the downstream tasks you might care about. This is in con-
trast to supervised learning while targeting the MNI point,
where the task clearly defines the both the correct amount
of information and which bits are likely to be important.
Our perspective on the importance of defining a task in order
to constrain the information in the representation suggests
that we can turn the problem into a data modeling problem
in which the practitioner who selects the dataset also “mod-
els” the likely form of the useful bits in the dataset for the
downstream task of interest.
In particular, given a dataset X, we propose selecting a func-
tion f (X) → X′ that transforms X into a new random vari-
able X′. This defines a paired dataset, P(X, X′), on which
we can use CEB as normal. Note that choosing the iden-
tity function for f results in maximal mutual information
between X and X′ (H(X) nats), which will result in a repre-
sentation that is far from the MNI for normal downstream
tasks.
It may seem that we have not proposed anything useful, as
the selection of f (.) is unconstrained, and seems much more
daunting than selecting β in a β VAE or σ in a penalty VAE.
However, there is a very powerful class of functions that
makes this problem much simpler, and that also make it
clear using CEB will only select bits from X that are useful.
That class of functions is the noise functions.
C.3.1. DENOISING CEB AUTOENCODER
Given a dataset X without labels or other targets, and some
set of tasks in mind to be solved by a learned representa-
tion, we may select a random noise variable U, and function
X′ = f (X,U) that we believe will destroy the irrelevant
information in X. We may then add representation vari-
ables ZX ,ZX′ to the model, giving the joint distribution
p(x, x′, u, zX , zX′) ≡ p(x)p(u)p(x′| f (x, u))e(zX |x)b(zX′ |x′).
This joint distribution is represented in Figure 7.
Denoising Autoencoders were originally proposed in Vin-
cent et al. (2008). In that work, the authors argue informally
that reconstruction of corrupted inputs is a desirable prop-
erty of learned representations. In this paper’s notation, we
could describe their proposed objective as minH(X|ZX′ ), or
equivalently min
〈
log d(x|zX′ = f (x, η))〉x,η∼p(x)p(θ) .
We also note that, practically speaking, we would like to
learn a representation that is consistent with uncorrupted
inputs as well. Consequently, we are going to use a bidirec-
tional model.
CEBdenoise ≡min I(X;ZX |X′) − I(X′;ZX) (36)
+ I(X′;ZX′ |X) − I(X;ZX′ ) (37)
⇒min−H(ZX |X) + H(ZX |X′) + H(X′|ZX) (38)
− H(ZX′ |X′) + H(ZX′ |X) + H(X|ZX′ )
(39)
This requires two encoders and two decoders, which may
seem expensive, but it permits a consistent learned repre-
sentation that can be used cleanly for downstream tasks.
Using a single encoder/decoder pair would result in either
ZX X X′
U
ZX′
Figure 7. Graphical model for the Denoising CEB Autoencoder.
an encoder that does not work well with uncorrupted inputs,
or a decoder that only generates noisy outputs.
If you are only interested in the learned representation and
not in generating good reconstructions, the objective sim-
plifies to the first three terms. In that case, the objective is
properly called a Noising CEB Autoencoder, as the model
predicts the noisy X′ from X:
CEBnoise ≡min I(X;ZX |X′) − I(X′;ZX) (40)
⇒min−H(ZX |X) + H(ZX |X′) + H(X′|ZX) (41)
In these models, the noise function, X′ = f (X,U) must
encode the practitioner’s assumptions about the structure of
information in the data. This obviously will vary per type
of data, and even per desired downstream task.
However, we don’t need to work too hard to find the perfect
noise function initially. A reasonable choice for f is:
f (x, η) = clip(x + η,D) (42)
η ∼ λU(−1, 1) ∗ D (43)
D = domain(X) (44)
In other words, add uniform noise scaled to the domain of X
and by a hyperparameter λ, and clip the result to the domain
of X. When λ = 1, X′ is indistinguishable from uniform
noise. As λ → 0, this maintains more and more of the
original information from X in X′. For some value of λ > 0,
most of the irrelevant information is destroyed and most of
the relevant information is maintained, if we assume that
higher frequency content in the domain of X is less likely to
contain the desired information. That information is what
will be retained in the learned representation.
Theoretical optimality of noise functions. Above we
claimed that this learning procedure will only select bits
that are useful for the downstream task, given that we se-
lect the proper noise function. Here we prove that claim
constructively. Imagine an oracle that knows which bits
of information should be destroyed, and which retained in
order to solve the future task of interest. Further imagine,
for simplicity, that the task of interest is classification. What
noise function must that oracle implement in order to en-
sure that CEBdenoise can only learn exactly the bits needed
for classification? The answer is simple: for every X = xi,
select X′ = x′i uniformly at random from among all of the
X = x j that should have the same class label as X = xi. Now,
the only way for CEB to maximize I(X;ZX′ ) and minimize
I(X′;ZX′ ) is by learning a representation that is isomorphic
to classification, and that encodes exactly I(X;Y) nats of in-
formation, even though it was only trained “unsupervisedly”
on X, X′ pairs. Thus, if we can choose the correct noise
function that destroys only the bits we don’t care about,
CEBdenoise will learn the desired representation and noth-
ing else (caveated by model, architecture, and optimizer
selection, as usual).
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